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**2015 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Substantive recommendations for incorporation into the  
final document of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States  
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**I. Introduction**

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non

Group further underscores that the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for



## II. Recommendations

### Principles and objectives

#### Recommendation 1

**To emphasize** that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in support of the inalienable right of its States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

#### Recommendation 2

**To reaffirm** that the full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains essential for promoting its credibility and effectiveness and in realizing its objectives.

#### Recommendation 3

**To reiterate** that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents the greatest threat to humanity and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional h

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**Recommendation 14**

**To strongly call for** the prompt and full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, particularly the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

**Recommendation 15**

**To emphasize** the necessity of starting negotiations w

**Recommendation 20**

**To reaffirm** the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

**Recommendation 21**

**To support** the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non

early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard; and (c) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

its aspects, it cannot substitute the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Recommendation 32**

**To support** the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards their total elimination.

**Recommendation 33**

**To stress** the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

**Recommendation 34**

**To stress** that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

**Recommendation 35**

**To call on** nuclear

**Recommendation 38**

**To underline** the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas, bearing in mind the special responsibility of countries that have undertaken nuclear tests towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories that have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.

**Recommendation 39**

**To call upon** the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive 0 1-327(o)-41(f)-P MCID u-41(i)-22(l)-34(i)-22(t)-46(y)-17( )-50(o)-41(f)-15( )-50(c1 720 241.97 43.2 r



**Recommendation 43**

**To call on nuclear-**

**Recommendation 49**

**To reaffirm** that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.

**Recommendation 50**

**To stress** the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon

non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

#### **Recommendation 54**

**To acknowledge** that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings should not be considered as legal safeguard obligations.

#### **Recommendation 55**

**To reaffirm** that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation, and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any State member of IAEA to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute, DQG WR FDOO XSRQ DOO 6WDWHV WR DYRLG DQ\ SUHV VXUH activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

#### **Recommendation 56**

**To confirm** that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV, and therefore States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

#### **Recommendation 57**

**To emphasize** that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Trea



remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

**Recommendation 64**

**To call upon** the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.

**Peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

**Recommendation 65**

**To underscore** that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technologi

**Recommendation 69**

**To express concern** that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Recommendation 70**

**To express concern** that some States parties have set conditions that limit the export of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing States parties, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol. Any such conditions contravene article IV of the Treaty, which is explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Recommendation 71**

**To reaffirm** that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

**Recommendation 72**

**To emphasize** that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**Recommendation 73**

**To express deep concern** over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

**Recommendation 74**

**To underscore** the importance of IAEA assistance, in particular to its developing member States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.



